Sign Up for PublicationsThe Labcorp Case and Its Potential Impact on Class Actions
The United States Supreme Court is poised to address a significant issue in class action litigation in the case of Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis (“Labcorp”). The central question is whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.
The case originates from allegations that Labcorp’s self-service check-in kiosks were not accessible to blind individuals, purportedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Act. The plaintiffs, a class of visually impaired individuals, filed a class-action lawsuit asserting that these kiosks impeded their ability to independently check in for services. Labcorp contends that many class members were either unaware of the kiosks or preferred human assistance, thereby lacking any concrete injury.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed class certification, holding that the named plaintiff, Vargas, “established an injury sufficient to confer standing” because “[a]s a result of the inaccessibility of the kiosk, Vargas was unable to immediately preserve his place in the patient queue, as sighted patients could, or to access any other kiosk features, such as the ability to privately alter account information.” Davis v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 22-55873, 2024 WL 489288, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024). Addressing the argument that some plaintiffs may not have used the kiosks even if they were compliant, and therefore could not have been injured by them, the Ninth Circuit further held that the presence of uninjured class members did not preclude certification at that stage.
If the Supreme Court agrees with LabCorp that the class was defined in such a way that a substantial portion of the class lacks standing, then the Supreme Court will need to resolve a circuit split on whether a class action could proceed. Some decisions have held that no class may be certified if it includes members lacking Article III standing. See, e.g., Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] class cannot be certified if it contains members who lack standing.”). Other decisions permitted certification as long as the number of uninjured members is de minimis. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2018) (certification permitted if there is “a reasonable and workable plan” to allow Defendants to contest injury for class members where plaintiffs lack viable common proof of injury); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017) (class certification permitted “[i]f the putative class includes only a de minimis number of uninjured members”). Finally, at least the Ninth Circuit has left open the possibility of certifying a class with “more than a de minimisnumber of uninjured class members.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 669 (9th Cir. 2022).
The Supreme Court has already held “[e]very class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). But as the Ninth Circuit explained in Olean, the Supreme Court expressly held open the question “whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 682 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2208 n.4 (emphasis omitted)). Labcorp provides a vehicle for the Court to answer the question left open in TransUnion. Regardless of the outcome, Labcorp is a critical case to watch for all class action practitioners and clients in the coming months.